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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

ISSUE I
IS THE APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE
PRIOR IN TIME AND SUPERIOR TO THAT OF RESPONDENTS' BY
VIRTUE OF APPELLANT'S LIS PENDENS, WHERE THE LIS
PENDENS CONTAINED A STREET ADDRESS FOR THE ENTIRE
PROPERTY AND A LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF ONE OF THE TWO
PARCELS COMPRISING THE PROPERTY?
ISSUE II
DID RESPONDENT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF APPELLANT'S
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY?
ISSUE III
DID RESPONDENTS HAVE A DUTY TO INQUIRE FURTHER AS TO
ANY CLAIM OF INTEREST OF APPELLANT, AS ESTABLISHED BY
THE FILING OF A LIS PENDENS COVERING AT LEAST A PORTION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND PROVIDING A STREET ADDRESS
FOR THE ENTIRE PROPERTY?
ISSUE IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RELYING ON THE CASE OF KOCH
v. SWANSON, 481 P.2d 915 (Wash. App. 1971) IN GRANTING
RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

iv

II*T THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
•oOo-

HANS C. RILLING,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 860499

v,
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, and KAY M.
LEWIS, ESQ., Trustee,
Defendants/Respondents,
-0O0-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case involving a request for a declaratory judgment,
Appellant filed a Complaint asserting three causes of action.
The first cause alleged that Appellant's interest in certain
real property created by a lis pendens filed in connection with a
divorce action was superior to Respondents1 claimed interest in
the same property arising by virtue of a Trust Deed given by
Appellant's wife in this property while the divorce action was
pending.

The Trust Deed had been signed and recorded after

Appellant's lis pendens had been recorded.
Both sides agreed there were no issues of material facts
related to Appellant's first cause and filed cross Motions for
Summary Judgment on the priority issue.

Supporting memoranda

were submitted by both sides and the matter was argued and
reported.
At the conclusion of the arguments, the Trial Court granted
Respondents' Motion and denied Appellant's Motion and ruled that
Respondents' Trust Deed had priority over Appellant's interest in
that portion of the property on which the marital residence was
located.
The remaining two causes dealt with claimed deficiencies in
the Respondents' Notice of Default and a related request for a
Restraining Order preventing a trustee's sale of the property
from going forward because of those deficiencies.

These causes

are not at issue on this appeal, the same having been dismissed.
Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal related to the Trial
Court's granting of Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and
the denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 31, 1981, Plaintiff/Appellant Hans C. Rilling

(hereinafter "Rilling") married Marsha Lang Rilling [R.57].
2.

Prior to that marriage, Marsha Lang Riling had been

awarded an equity and possessory interest in a home and residential lot located at 2810 Fillmore, Ogden, Utah, in a Decree of
Divorce from her first husband, Robert F. Lang.

The legal

description of this real estate is:
Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden City,
Weber County, Utah: Beginning on the East
line of Fillmore Avenue, 280.81 feet South
2

58f East of 28th Street; thence South 89°2'
East 150 feet; thence North 58 ! West 10 feet;
thence North 59°29f40" West 172.41 feet, more
or less, to Fillmore Avenue; thence South 58'
West to beginning.
Also, a Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden
City, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at a
point 480 feet North 0° 58' East from the
Southwest corner of said Block 4, and running
thence North 0° 58 f 120 feet along the East
side of Fillmore Avenue; thence South 89° 02f
East 280.89 feet; thence South 0° 58' West
120 feet; thence North 89° 02 f West 280.89
feet to the place of beginning. Situated in
the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter of Section 34, Township 6 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake City Meridian, U.S.
Survey. [R.57-58].
The property consists of two contiguous parcels.

This first

parcel (Parcel A) is the larger of the two and is the one on
which the home is located and is legally described in the first
paragraph of the two-part description.

The second parcel (Parcel

B) is smaller, contains no improvements and is legally described
in the second paragraph of the two-part description.
3.

The following diagram taken from the plat demonstrates

the size of each parcel and the location of each in relation to
each other and Fillmore Avenue:
\
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4.

The entire property was brought by Marsha Lang Rilling

into the marriage with Rilling and was subsequently used as their
marital residence until their separation.

Rilling, during the

course of the marriage, made substantial investments in, and
improvements to, the property
5.

[R.58].

When Marsha Lang Rilling filed for divorce against

Rilling, he filed an answer and a lis pendens related to the
divorce action and his interest in the above-described real
property.

The lis pendens

was recorded on May 11, 19 83, with

the Weber County Recorder's Office [R.18].

(A copy of the

document which was recorded has been included as Exhibit "A" in
the Addendum to this Brief.)

The lis pendens gave notice that a

divorce action was then pending between Marsha Lang Rilling and
Hans C. Rilling, and that the action involved the parties' title
to and interest in the real property located at 2810 Fillmore
Avenue, Ogden, Utah.

The lis pendens

on its face contained the

correct legal description of the smaller parcel (Parcel B ) . It
also referred to an attached valuation notice and stated,
"Attached is the valuation notice also setting forth the legal
description."

It did not contain the legal description on the

larger parcel (Parcel A ) .
6.

In 1983, while the above described divorce action was

still pending, Marsha Lang Rilling applied for a loan from
Respondent, First Security Financial (hereinafter FSF), and, in
conjunction with that loan, gave a second Deed of Trust to FSF in
all of 2810 Fillmore (Parcel A and Parcel B) [R.76].
4

The funds

were disbursed on or about November 4, 1983, and the Deed of
Trust was recorded in the Weber County Recorder's Office on
November 8, 1983 [R.76].
7.

Michael V. Lewis, for reasons not known, researched the

title to the property in question for FSF on November 9, 1983,
one day after the Trust Deed was recorded and stated that the
only interest of Rilling he discovered was the lis pendens which
had been recorded on May 11, 1983.

He stated in his Affidavit

the following:
2.
I am and for in excess of 10 years
have been employed and engaged in the business
of title insurance, abstracting, real property
titles, and related subjects. . . .
4.
I last examined title to the tracts
of property described above on 11-9-83. That
examination disclosed that as of November 9,
1983, there was no instrument recorded at the
office of the Weber County Recorder indicating
any potential interest in the two tracts of
property described above (or either of them)
in favor of Hans C. Rilling except the Lis
Pendens, a certified copy of which is
attached hereto marked Exhibit "A." The Lis
Pendens describes only Tract 1. TJiis Lis
Pendens contains no legal description of any
part of Tract 2. [R.81-82].
8.

The Preliminary Title Report ordered by FSF in relation

to the loan request of Ms. Lang, contained no reference to the
lis pendens which had earlier been recorded by Rilling.

(See

FSF's Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Production of
Documents and Affidavit of Joseph Caldiero [R.76-77].)
9.

A Decree of Divorce was entered on September 19, 1984,

and it provided, in relevant part, that use and possession of the

5

2810 Fillmore property was awarded to Marsha Rilling, subject to
her assuming any obligations owed thereon, and further subject to
a lien in favor of Rilling in the sum of $53,493.00, payable to
him without interest upon sale of the property.

The Decree

further provided that the property was to be sold [R.59].

(A

copy of the Decree of Divorce is included as Exhibit "B" in the
Addendum to this Brief.)
10.

Rilling had no notice or knowledge of FSF's Trust Deed

until the trial of the divorce action on February 16, 1984
[R.60].
11.

On June 4, 1985, FSF recorded a Notice of Default and

attempted to foreclose its Deed of Trust.

It claimed its

interest in the property was prior in time and superior to that
of Rilling [R.60].
12.

Prior to the Trustee's Sale which had been scheduled by

FSF, Rilling filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
seeking, among other things, a determination from the Court as to
whose interest in the property as between Rilling and FSF was
superior [R.l-26; R.60].
13.

FSF and Defendant, Kay Lewis, FSF f s Trustee, answered

and responded to discovery propounded by Rilling.

Both parties

then filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment and memoranda and
affidavits in support of their respective positions [R.55-56;
R.97-98; R.118-121] .
14.

The parties agreed there were no material facts in

dispute and argued their motions to the Trial Court [R.133, 136,
6

147].

The proceeding was reported [R.135-158].

During the

course of the arguments, FSF admitted that Rilling had a superior
interest in the smaller parcel (Parcel B) by reason of the lis
pendens, which had been recorded before FSF's second Deed of
Trust [R.147].
15.

At the conclusion of the arguments, the Trial Court

ruled that Rilling1s position in the smaller parcel was superior
to FSF's position, but that because the lis pendens did not
contain the legal description of the larger parcel, FSF's position in the larger parcel was superior to that of Rilling!s and
in so ruling relied on the case of Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d 915
(Wash. App. 1971) [R.118-122; 156-157].
14.

The parties stipulated to dismiss the remaining counts

of Rilling1s Complaint related to deficiencies in FSF's attempted
Trust Deed foreclosure, and an Order of Dismissal was subsequently
entered and Rilling timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the Trial
Court's ruling on the issue of priority of interest in the larger
parcel of the subject property.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
Rilling1s lis pendens was properly recorded on May 11, 1983,
and gave FSF constructive notice of Rilling1s interest in the
subject property, pursuant to § 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1983),
and is superior to FSF's interest created by its Deed of Trust
recorded on November 8, 1983.

Consequently, FSF took subject to
7

Rilling's interest in the subject property and FSF's lien in the
property is junior and inferior to Rilling's lien granted under
the Decree of Divorce.
A.
FSF acquired only the interest of Marsha Lang Rilling in the
property, subject to whatever disposition the Court might make of
it in the pending divorce action.
B.
Under the circumstances, FSF should have made further
inquiry as to the status of the property, and it failed to do so
prior to taking its Deed of Trust.
C.
The Trial Court's reliance on the case of Koch v. Swanson,
481 P.2d 915 (Wash. App. 1971) was misplaced.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S LIS PENDENS WAS PROPERLY RECORDED BEFORE
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL'S INTEREST WAS RECORDED
AND, THEREFORE, APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF
RESPONDENT FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL
A.
Appellant's Lis Pendens Gave Respondents
Constructive Notice of Appellant's
Interest in the Subject Property
Section 78-40-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides in relevant
part as follows:

8

In any action affecting title to, or the
right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief
is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the
recorder of the county in which the property
or some part thereof is situated a notice of
pendency of the action, containing the names
of the parties, the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in
that county affected thereby. From the time
of filing such notice for record only shall a
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
and only of its pendency against parties
designated by their real names. Id.
Under this provision in order for the lis pendens to constitute constructive notice to a purchaser or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby the recorded notice must contain:

(1)

the names of the parties; (2) the object of the action or defense;
and (3) a description of the property affected thereby.
In the present case, the lis pendens filed by Rilling on May
11, 1983, indicated that a divorce action was pending in Weber
County.

It gave the names of both parties and it identified

Marsha Lang Rilling by both her prior married name of "Rilling"
and her prior married name of "Lang," the name she used in
applying for the loan with FSF.

It contained the address of the

entire property (a single family residence), an accurate legal
description of one of the two parcels making up the subject
property and a reference to an attached valuation notice with an
additional legal description.

FSF f s Trust Deed was not recorded

until November 8, 1983, and it contained the description of
9

Parcel A and the description of Parcel B, which was also included
in Rilling's lis pendens.
The fact that Rillingfs lis pendens described only a portion
of the subject property does not limit Rillingfs claim of interest
only to that portion.

Section 78-40-2, supra, requires only that

the notice give a description of the property —

it does not

specifically require a complete legal description.

All that is

necessary is a description which is sufficient to give a purchaser
or encumbrancer constructive notice of the pendency of the action
and the property which may be affected by the outcome of that
action.

In this case, the fact that the notice gave the correct

street address of the entire property and a correct legal
description of one of the parcels comprising the residential lot,
is sufficient to satisfy the description requirement of the
statute.
Rilling1s lis pendens also clearly gave FSF notice that a
divorce action was pending between Marsha Lang Rilling and Hans
C. Rilling and that any property owned by those two parties would
be subject to the divorce action.

As was stated in Hidden

Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979):
The sole purpose of recording a lis
pendens is to give constructive notice of the
pendency of proceedings which may be derogatory to an owner's title or right to
possession, [footnote] One who takes with
full knowledge that the property taken is the
subject of on-going litigation acquires only
the grantor's interest therein, subject to
whatever disposition the court might make of
it. [footnote] Id. at 1248.

10

(See also,

Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah

1978); Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 654 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982).)
In this case, there was sufficient information in the public
record to alert FSF of Killing's claim of interest in the
property to place FSF on constructive, if not actual, notice of
the status of the title to the 2810 Fillmore property.

The Trial

Court erred in concluding that Rilling's lis pendens was insufficient to place FSF on notice of Rilling's claimed interest in the
property.
B.
Respondents Should Have Made Further
Inquiry as to the Status
of the Property
Under the undisputed facts of this case, FSF should have
made further inquiry as to the status of the property before
accepting Ms. Lang's Trust Deed and advancing her loan proceeds.
The general rule on notice and lis pendens is set forth in 8
Thompson on Real Property, § 4308 (1963) , entitled "Lis Pendens
as Constructive Notice."

It states that:

If the facts suggest further inquiry, the lis
pendens is notice of any other facts which
could have been ascertained in the pursuit of
such inquiry with ordinary prudence and
diligence. Id. at 338.
See also, 51 Am. Jur.2d, Lis Pendens § 20 (1970).
In this case, the legal description in the lis pendens did
"suggest further inquiry" on the part of FSF.

Had such inquiry

been conducted, FSF would have discovered that a dispute existed

11

between the owners of the 2810 Fillmore Avenue property, Marsha
Lang Rilling and Hans C. Rilling, regarding their respective
interests in the entire property not just in the parcel specifically described to in the formal legal description in Rilling1s
lis pendens,

At the very least, it placed FSF on notice that

Rilling was claiming an interest in at least one-half of the
subject property given his status as Ms. Lang's husband.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that Mr. Lewis,
an experienced person evidently hired by FSF to research title to
this property on November 9, 1983, one day after FSF had recorded
Marsha Lang's Trust Deed, discovered and noted the existence of
Rilling's lis pendens.

He specifically states:

4.
1 last examined title to the tracts
of property described above on 11-9-83. That
examination disclosed that as of November 9,
1983, there was no instrument recorded at the
office of the Weber County Recorder indicating
any potential interest in the two tracts of
property described above (or either of them)
in favor of Hans C. Rilling except the Lis
Pendens, a certified copy of which is
attached hereto marked Exhibit "A.lf The Lis
Pendens describes only Tract 1. This Lis
Pendens contains no legal description of any
part of Tract 2. [R.81-82].
The most reasonable explanation is that the title company
employed by FSF in October of 1983 missed Rilling's lis pendens
when searching title in connection with FSF's loan to and trust
deed from Marsha Lang Rilling.

That explanation is most

plausible when the preliminary title report which referred to
both parcels of the property did not mention, nor except from

12

coverage, the lis pendens which specifically described and
affected one of those parcels.
A pivotal fact in this case is that the property involved,
while technically consisting of two parcels, was used in its
entirety as a single family residence.

As such, Rilling1s lis

pendens, setting out the address of the entire property, a
partial legal description and the fact that Hans and Marsha
Rilling were involved in a divorce proceeding wherein Rilling
claimed an interest in the property, would, at a minimum, put any
party of "ordinary prudence and diligence" on notice of Rilling1s
possible claims and would compel further inquiry regarding the
status of Hans and Marsha Lang Rillingfs respective interests in
this family residence.

FSF, as an experienced and professional

lender, dealing regularly with real estate transactions, was
under an affirmative duty (perhaps even more than a person of
"ordinary prudence and diligence") to inquire into the status of
Rilling1s claims in light of the lis pendens that had been
recorded and was a matter of public record.

FSF did not fulfill

this duty and, therefore, is precluded from now claiming its
interest in the property should be afforded priority over
Rilling 1 s.

C.
The Trial Court's Reliance on the Holding of
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d 915 (Wash. App. 1971)
in Finding for the Respondents was Erroneous

13

In granting FSF's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial
Court said it was persuaded by the holding in Koch v. Swanson,
supra, a case urged as dispositive by FSF.

The Trial Court

stated:
I think the Koch or Coach case, however you
pronounce it, is persuasive to me, where the
Lis Pendens very clear on its face describes
a tract of land at a location will not
require persons put on notice to wonder
whether it includes other tracts located at
the same address. . . . [R.156-157].
In taking this position, the Trial Court did not consider
and follow the rule that imposes a duty to inquire further into
the status of title to property should there be information in
the public record which would reasonably alert an inquiring party
of claims of interest in and to that property.

In this case, the

information contained on the lis pendens was such that FSF should
have made further inquiry.

The use of the entire address consti-

tuted notice as to both parcels.

It would not have been necessary

for FSF to have searched all county records to find the status of
Parcel A -- the address should have immediately directed FSF to
it.

Likewise, the lis pendens as recorded was sufficient to give

FSF notice that a divorce action was pending between Rilling and
his wife and that the property at 2810 Fillmore Avenue, would be
subject to the divorce action.

This information fulfills the

sole purpose of a lis pendens as expressed in Hidden Meadows Dev.
Co. v Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979), by giving "constructive
notice of a pendency of proceedings which may be derogatory to an
owner's title or right to possession."
14

Id., at 1248.

FSF had

access to this information, had its title searcher not overlooked
the lis pendens when searching title to the property which had
two legal descriptions attributable to it.
In reaching its decision, the Trial Court concluded that
this case was very similar to Koch, supra, and that the position
urged by Rilling would place too onerous a burden on parties
searching title to property.
misplaced.

That reliance on Koch, supra, is

In Koch, supra, the Plaintiff's mortgage was errone-

ously described as pertaining to "Tract 125."

They brought suit

against the individual mortgagee and the second mortgagor whose
mortgage correctly described the same property as "Tract 124."
That court concluded that it would be an impossible burden to
expect a party to search beyond the county auditor's records to
find the encumbrance on the erroneously recorded tract.
The present case is clearly distinguishable.

In Koch, the

defendant had no clue as to where to go to inquire further.

In

our case, FSF did not have to go on a blind search, not knowing
where or what to inquire.

The street address and legal descrip-

tion of one parcel was like a road sign directing FSF to exactly
where it needed to make further inquiry.

It would not have had

to check all the records, but simply inquire as to the status of
Parcel A from Ms. Lang, Rilling or Plaintiff's attorney, Paul
Liapis, all of whom were identified on the recorded lis pendens.
That is not the onerous burden the Koch court sought to avoid.
For these reasons, Koch is not a sound basis for the Trial

15

Court's decision.

The Trial Court's decision to grant FSF's

Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Rilling's Motion was
incorrect, was based upon inapplicable authority and did not
follow the law pertaining to a parties1 duty to inquire further
when there is information of public record which would reasonably
require further inquiry.

CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed
and Rillingfs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Rillingfs lis pendens was recorded on May 11, 1983, and FSF's
Trust Deed was not recorded until November 8, 1983.

There is no

dispute that Rilling's lis pendens gave the street address of the
entire parcel of property, an accurate legal description of one
of the two parcels comprising the property and identified all
parties to the pending divorce action.

Because the description

of property included in Rillingfs lis pendens was sufficient to
give FSF constructive notice of Rilling!s interest in the property
and of the pendency of an action concerning the property; and
because the information contained in the lis pendens, if it had
been discovered and reviewed by FSF as it should have been,
required that FSF make further inquiry regarding the status of
Hans C. Rilling's and Marsha Lang Rillingfs respective interests
in the property.

Since FSF failed to make such inquiry, FSF, and

not Rilling, should be placed in a subordinate position in
relation to the competing interests in the property.
16

Appellant

is entitled to a Summary Judgment in his favor and his costs
related to this appeal.

The Trial Court's decision should be

reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/^

day of January, 1987.

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING/& LIAPIS

KEltfT M. KAST^lflG
Attorneys for Appellant
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GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Defendant
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-6996
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MARSHA LANG RILLING,
Plaintiff,

:

LIS PENDENS

:

Civil No. 84224

v.
HANS C. RILLING,,
Defendant,

ooOoo
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a divorce action has been
commenced and is now pending in this Court as against the
above-named Defendant, and said action, among other things,
involves the above-named parties' title to and interest in
the following described real property located at 2810 Fillmore
Avenue, Ogden, Utah, Weber County, State of Utah:
Part of Block 4, Maule Addition, Ogden City, Weber
County, Utah: Beginning on the East line of Fillmore
Avenue, 280.81 feet South 58' East of 28th Street,
thence South 89°2f East 150 feet; thence North 5 8 '
West 10 feet; thence North 59°29,40" West 172.41 feet
more or less to Fillmore Avenue, thence South 5 8 '
West to beginning.
Attached is the valuation notice also setting forth the legal
description.
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DATED t h

i._2

day o f May,

1983.

GUSTIN, ADAFf<f,y KASTING & LIAPIS

a^f^
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

Q

day of May, 1983, personally appeared before

me Paul H. Liapis, who being first duly sworn upon oath,
acknowledged to ire that said individual has read the foregoing
Lis Pendens, believes the contents thereof, and executed the
same of said individuals free act and desire.

tRY PUBLIC
J
iding at Salt Lake City, Utah
^KMy > Oomnjissrion Expires:
- >

A-

2

FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 39 4-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARSHA LANG RILLING,
Plaintiff,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
Civil No. 84244
HANS C. RILLING,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter was tried before the
Court on the 16th day of February, 1984, the Honorable RONALD
O. HYDE presiding.

The plaintiff and the defendant were

each personally present and represented by their respective
counsel, FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY and PAUL H. LIAPIS.

The parties

were sworn and testified, and exhibits were marked,
identified, and received by the Court,

Each of the parties

rested their respective cases and argued the matter to the
Court.

The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, and being
fully advised in the premises, now
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Each of the parties is awarded a decree of

divorce, divorcing them from the other, which divorces shall
become final and absolute upon entry of the divorce decree,
2.

The plaintiff is awarded the property and

premises known as 2810 Fillmore Avenue, more fully described
as follows:
A part of Block 4, Maule Addition to Ogden,
Utah: Beginning on the East line of Fillmore
Avenue, 280*81 feet South 58f East of 28th
Street; thence South 89 # 02 f East 1S0 feet;
thence North 58• West 10 feet; thence North
59#29,40f' West 172.41 feet, more or less, to
Fillmore Avenue; thence South 58' West to
beginning.
Also, a part of Block 4, Maule Addition to
Ogden City, Utah: Beginning at a point 480
feet North 0*58' East from the Southwest corner
of said Block 4, and running thence North 0*58'
East 120 feet along the East side of Fillmore
Avenue; thence South 89 # 02 f East 280.89 feet;
thence South 0 # 58 f West 120 feet; thence North
89#02f West 280.89 feet to the place of
beginning.
||

Situated in the Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 6
North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake City Meridian,
U. S. Survey.
Subject to the mortgage debts owing, which she shall assume
and pay, saving the defendant harmless therefrom, and subject
to the defendant's investment equity therein in the sum of
$53,493.00, payable to him, without interest, upon the sale
of said property.
3.

The property and premises known as 2810

Fillmore Avenue, Ogden, Utah, more fully described in the
preceding paragraph, are forthwith to be sold, and the
CAW o r r i c c
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plaintiff and the defendant are required to fully cooperate
with each other in effecting a sale.

Should a licensed real

estate broker be engaged to assist in the sale of the
property and premises, the defendant is entitled to make
inquiry of said broker to determine efforts being made in
accomplishing a sale and progress being experienced.

The

defendant is required to pay 33-1/3 percent of all costis of
sale incurred in connection with the 6ale of said property
and premises, together with 33-1/3 percent of annual general
property taxes until said property and premises are sold.
4.

The plaintiff is awarded the following

described personal properties:
(a)

The personal properties owned and

possessed by her prior to the parties1 marriage.
(b)

The gifts of jewelry made to her by the

defendant, including the engagement/wedding ring.
(c)

Her personal checking and savings

accounts, if any.
(d)

Her personal automobile, subject to debts

owing against the same, which she shall assume and pay,
saving the defendant harmless therefrom.
(e)
5.

Her personal effects and belongings.

The defendant is awarded the following

described personal properties:
(a)
LAW o r n c c
FindUy P. GcidUy
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The personal properties owned and

possessed by him prior to the parties' marriage, including
silver service given to him as a gift by his mother,
(b)

His personal checking and savings

accounts, if any.
(c)

His personal automobile, subject to debts

owing against the same, which he shall assume and pay, saving
the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(d)

The Utah Valley Limited Partnership

(e)

His personal effects and belongings.

investment.

6.

The defendant is awarded the items of furniture

subject to the Dinwoodys' debt, should he indicate to the
plaintiff his desire to have them.
7.

The plaintiff is awarded the sum of $6,000.00,

representing her interest in the increase in the defendant's
retirement account with the University of Utah, which total
sum shall be paid to her by the defendant at the rate of
$250.00 per month for 24 consecutive months following entry
of the divorce decree.
8.

Neither of the parties is awarded alimony.

9.

The plaintiff is required to assume and pay the

following debts and obligations, saving the defendant
harmless therefrom:
(a)
described.
CAW o r r i c c
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The real property mortgages hereinabove

(b)

Nieman-Marcus.

(c)

Bananas*

(d)

Nordstroms.

(e)

Bettie Marsh-

(f)

Utah Educational Loan Services,

(g)

Weinstocks.

(h)

First Security Bank (VISA),

(i)

Intermountain Dermatology Foundation,

(j)

Texaco.

<k)

Feminine Fitness World.

(1)

Any other obligations incurred by her in

her own name since filing of the divorce Complaint.
10.

The defendant is required to assume and pay the

following debts and obligations, saving the plaintiff
harmless therefrom:
(a)

Continental Bank (master card).

(b)

American Savings and Loan (VISA).

<c)

The debt and obligation owing his mother.

<d)

Dinwoodys.

<e)

Any other obligations incurred by him in

his own name since filing of the divorce Complaint.
11.

The plaintiff and the defendant will file

amended tax returns for the year 1982, if by doing so the tax
liability of the plaintiff will not change or alter in any
way to her detriment or disadvantage.
CAW orncc
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12.

The plaintiff is restored her former name of

13.

Each of the parties is required to assume and

LANG.

pay their individual attorney's fees and costs of action
incurred.
DATED this

day o f ^ ^ ^ n J U t . , 1984.

RONALD 0. HYDE, DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED/AS .TO FARM AND CONTENT

PAUL H.^LTAPTJ
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to PAUL H. LIAPIS,
attorney foe defendant, 3rd Floor, New York Building, 48 Post
Office Plaza, Salt Lake City Utah 84101, postage prepaid, on
this j(W\6ay

of ^y^fS^Loj

# 1984.

